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We introduce a xpoint semantics for logic programs with two kinds of negation: an explicit
negation and a negation-by-failure. The programs may also be prioritized, that is, their clauses
may be arranged in a partial order that reects preferences among the corresponding rules. This
yields a robust framework for representing knowledge in logic programs with a considerable
expressive power. The declarative semantics for such programs is particularly suitable for
reasoning with uncertainty, in the sense that it pinpoints to the incomplete and inconsistent
parts of the data, and regards the remaining information as classically consistent. As such, this
semantics allows to draw conclusions in a non-trivial way even in cases that the logic programs
under consideration are not consistent. Finally, we show that this formalizm may be regarded
as a simple and 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1 Introduction
Our goal in this paper is twofold: To give semantics to logic programs with a strong expressive
power, and to provide within this context \proper" means of managing inconsistent and incomplete
information. Clearly, both these requirements have direct impacts on the way that knowledge is
represented and on the way that it is processed by the underlying formalizm. We therefore begin
by considering some aspects of knowledge representation and reasoning in light of our goals.
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1.1 Knowledge representation
The fundamental role of knowledge representation in articial intelligence in general and in logic
programming in particular is well acknowledged. No wonder, then, that this is one of the most
extensively investigated topics in these areas. Here we manly focus on dierent ways to represent
negative data in logic programs, since we believe that this is a key concept for a proper treatment
of inconsistency and incompleteness in the context of commonsense reasoning.
It has long been claimed that there are many cases in which only one type of negation is not
sucient for describing a given situation (see, e.g., [9, Section 3.1] and [47] for detailed discus-
sions on this and other related issues). It has therefore been suggested to use two operators for
representing two dierent types of negative information. Several formalisms that give semantics
to logic programs with two kinds of negation have been proposed in the literature (see, e.g.,
[1, 24, 26, 30, 36, 37, 41] and a survey in [9, Section 3]). One kind of negation, denoted here by
:, corresponds to an \explicit" negative data. Its role, like that of negation in classical logic, is to
represent counter-information. The other kind of negation, denoted here by not, corresponds to
a more \implicit" negative data. It is usually used for expressing the fact that the corresponding
assertion cannot be proved or decided on the basis of the available information. It is therefore usual
to associate this connective with \negation-as-failure" (to prove the corresponding assertion). The
dierent nature of the two kinds of negations is demonstrated in the following example:
Example 1.1 Consider a rule that expresses the fact that \If someone is innocent (s)he cannot
be guilty". This rule may be represented by the following implication:
:guilty(x) innocent(x)
I.e., innocence must entail no guilt. On the other hand, a rule such as the following one:
innocent(x) not guilty(x)
is somewhat less strict. It may be understood as stating that \someone is innocent as long as it
has not been proven that (s)he is guilty".
It follows, then, that the two negation operators should be used in dierent contexts. This is
further illustrated in the following example (borrowed from [26]):
Example 1.2 Consider a rule that states that \a school bus may cross a railway tracks if there
is no crossing train". This rule may be represented by the following implication:
cross railway tracks :train is comming:
However, it should not be expressed as follows:
cross railway tracks not train is comming
The reason for this is that the condition in the latter clause holds in cases that there is no informa-
tion about the presence or the absence of a train. This is a much weaker condition than that of the
former clause, which is satised only if there is an explicit evidence that no train is approaching.
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The existence of two dierent operators that represent dierent kinds of negative information
aects also the way that queries are represented and evaluated. This is so since it is now possible
to distinguish between a query that fails because it does not succeed , and a query that fails in a
stronger sense, that its negation succeeds.
As we have already implied, the use of two kinds of negation is also useful for handling inconsist-
ent and incomplete information. It goes without saying that for dening a robust formalism that
handles uncertainty, one should at least be able to represent situations in which uncertainty arise.
In other words, a plausible framework for managing uncertainty should support the representation
the following types of data/knowledge:
 Inconsistent information. A representation of contradictory data should be allowed within the
language (Unlike, e.g., positive logic programs, the syntax of which rules out any possibility
of representing contradictions.
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)
 Partial knowledge. I.e., the ability to deal directly with incomplete information by explicitly
pointing out to cases in which the data (or the knowledge) is incomplete.
 (Hierarchy of) exceptions. I.e., the ability to disregard some piece of information in the pres-
ence of another. More generally, making preferences among dierent rules. Such preferences
may be represented either in the programs language itself or in the `meta-language' (as an
additional information, not necessarily represented in a clausal form, and sometimes not even
specied by a rst-order formulae).
In what follows we shall see how all these dierent types of knowledge are represented in our
framework. Intuitively, it is probably clear already that the strong negation : will be useful
for representing contradictory data, while the negation-by-failure operator not will be useful for
representing incomplete data. In addition, we will also allow an additional information, expressed
as a \meta-knowledge", which exhibits preferences of certain pieces of information over others.
1.2 Reasoning with uncertainty
Roughly, logic programming is a combination of logic as a representation language and the theory of
(constructive) automated deduction. The rst aspect was considered with respect to uncertainty
in the previous section. Here we address the other aspect within the same context. The two
main requirements in this respect are non-monotonicity and paraconsistency [14]. I.e., partial
information should be accompanied with a formalism for default reasoning that can modify its set
of conclusions in the light of new data, and the semantics for inconsistent logic programs should
not be trivial, that is, inconsistent information should not entail every conclusion. We demonstrate
these properties in the following examples:
1
Furthermore, even some formalisms that do allow negations in the clause bodies and heads (e.g., [26, 30, 41]),
treat atomic formulae and their negations as two dierent ways of representing atomic information, so practically a
representation of inconsistent information is not possible in this case as well. We shall return to this issue in what
follows.
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Example 1.3 Consider the following logic program, where p and q are two atomic formulae, and
t is a propositional constant that corresponds to the classical truth value that represents true
assertions.
P = fq  t; p t; :p not :qg
Intuitively, P may be understood such that both p and q are known to be true, and :p is also true
provided that it cannot be shown that the negation of q holds. In this interpretation, P clearly
contains an inconsistent information regarding p. However, a paraconsistent formalism should not
attach to P a trivial xpoint semantics. Moreover, the consistent part of the program (fq tg in
the case of P above) should be easily distinguishable from the inconsistent part (i.e., P n fq tg).
Suppose now that a new datum arrives, and it indicates that if p holds then :q must hold as
well. The new program is therefore the following:
P
0
= P [ f:q  pg
Now, the information regarding p becomes consistent (as the condition for concluding :p does not
hold anymore), while the data regarding q is now inconsistent. A non-monotonic formalism should
adapt itself to the new situation. In particular, while the query :p should succeed where P is the
underlying program, it should fail w.r.t. P
0
.
Example 1.4 A robust formalism for reasoning with uncertainty should also be able to handle
incomplete information in a plausible way. This is demonstrated in the following example:
P = fq  t; p not pg
This time P contains an incomplete information regarding p. Unlike some formalisms that do
not provide any model for this program (e.g., the stable model semantics [25]), we claim that a
proper semantics for P should distinguish between the meaningful data in P (fq tg), and the
meaningless data (fp not pg). Note that the well-founded semantics [46] do provide a plausible
solution to this case. In what follows (Section 3.2) we shall use this property of the well-founded
semantics for dening our way of handling incomplete data.
As classical logic is neither non-monotonic nor paraconsistent, reasoning with partial or con-
tradictory information should be done in a non-classical way (see, e.g., [5, 6, 10, 11, 31, 33, 38]
for some formal methods of doing so). In our case we use multiple-valued semantics in which
there are particular truth values that correspond to dierent degrees of contradictions and partial
information (see Sections 2.2 and 4.2 below).
The structure of the paper
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In the next section we present our framework. In
particular, we consider some issues that are related to the semantical nature of our formalism,
such as showing that Belnap four-valued structure [10, 11] is particularly suitable for representing
the kind of information we intend to decode in the logic programs. In Section 3 we introduce
our xpoint theory, rst for logic programs without negation-as-failure, and then for the general
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case. In Section 4 we further generalize our formalism to cases in which the logic programs under
consideration are prioritized, i.e., every clause has its own relative priority over the other clauses.
For extending our semantics to the prioritized case we accordingly consider a generalization of the
four-valued semantical structure to a boarder family of multiple-valued algebraic structures, called
bilattices [19, 27, 28]. The semantics that is obtained is then discussed and its main properties are
demonstrated by some examples. In section 5 we summarize the main properties of our formalism
(also with respect to other related xpoint semantics), and conclude.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Logic programs
In what follows p; q; r denote atomic formulae, l; l
1
; l
2
; : : : denote literals (i.e., atomic formulae that
may be preceded by :), and e; e
1
; e
2
; : : : denote extended literal (i.e. literals that may be preceded
by not). The complement of a literal l is denoted by l (that is, if l=p for some atom p then l=:p,
and if l=:p then l=p). As usual in the context of logic programming, we shall deal with formulae
in a clause form, as dened below:
Denition 2.1 Let n;m0.
 A positive clause is a formula of the form p p
1
; : : : ; p
n
2
 A standard clause is a formula of the form p p
1
; : : : ; p
m
; not p
m+1
; : : : ; not p
m+n
 A normal clause is a formula of the form p l
1
; : : : ; l
n
 A general clause is a formula of the form l l
1
; : : : ; l
n
 An extended clause is a formula of the form l e
1
; : : : ; e
n
Given a clause l  e
1
; e
2
; : : : ; e
n
, we say that l is the cause head , and e
1
; : : : ; e
n
is the clause
body (sometimes abbreviated by Body). The clause head is also called the conclusion (of the
clause), and each element in the clause body is called a condition (of the clause). The set of the
(extended) literals that appear in Body is denoted by L(Body).
A (possibly innite) set P of extended (respectively: positive, standard, normal, general)
clauses is called an extended (respectively: positive, standard , normal , general) logic program.
2.2 Some semantical considerations
A. The underlying multy-valued structures
First, we should decide what underlying semantics is most suitable for our intended formalism.
It is well-accepted that two-valued semantics is an appropriate semantical framework for positive
2
Such formulae are also called denite clauses or Horn clauses.
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logic programs. This is so since every positive logic program P has a unique least Herbrand model,
which is identical to the least xpoint of van-Emden and Kowalski's immediate consequence oper-
ator [45] of P. It follows, therefore, that the \intended" semantics of positive logic programs can
be captured within the two-valued setting.
Things are getting more complicated when negations may appear in the clause bodies. In such
cases a least two-valued model does not always exist (Consider, e.g., P=fp not pg), and there
are cases in which several minimal two-valued models exist (For instance, P=fp :q; q :pg has
two minimal Herbrand models. In one of them p is true and q is false, and in the other one q is true
and p is false). One common way to overcome these problems is to consider a minimization w.r.t.
a three valued semantics: Fitting's operator [18, 22], based on Kripke/Kleene 3-valued semantics
[29] always yields a least xpoint when applied to normal logic programs, and this is also the case
with the three-valued well-founded semantics [46], applied to standard logic programs. Under some
further assumption(s) on the syntactical structure of the logic programs under consideration, some
other 2-valued and 3-valued xpoint semantics are uniquely determined. For instance, as shown
in [39, 40], every standard logic program that is weakly stratied [39] has a unique weakly perfect
model [39], which coincides with its unique stable model [25] and its unique well-founded model [46].
When negations may also appear in the clause heads, the logic programs may be inconsistent,
and so unless inconsistency reduces to triviality, neither 2-valued nor 3-valued models can capture
the semantics of such programs anymore. Briey, this is due to the fact that if P is some general
(or extended) logic program, then an \appropriate" semantics for it should be able to distinguish
among the following four dierent cases:
1. p is a positive fact of P (i.e., the clause p t appears in P),
2. p is a negative fact of P (i.e., the clause :p t appears in P),
3. p is both a positive and a negative fact of P (i.e., fp t; :p tg  P),
4. Neither p nor :p is the head of any clause in P.
Intuitively, while in the rst two cases one expects that p would have a classical value (assuming
that p does not appear in any other clause head in P), in the latter two cases two other values should
be attached to p: One for denoting that the data regarding p is inconsistent (as in case 3 above),
and the other for denoting that there is an insucient information regarding p (as in case 4 above).
It follows that in order to capture these four dierent cases on the semantical level, a semantical
structure for general or extended logic programs should contain (at least) four dierent elements.
Probably the best-known structure with this property is Belnap's FOUR (Figure 1).
Belnap's algebraic structure was introduced in [10, 11] as a semantical tool for representing
dierent states of a reasoner's knowledge (or belief). This structure consists of four truth values:
the classical ones (t; f), a truth value (?) that intuitively represents lack of information, and a
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Figure 1: Belnap four-valued structure, FOUR
truth value (>) that may intuitively be understood as representing contradictions. These four
elements are simultaneously arranged in two partial orders. In one of them (denoted here by 
t
),
f is the minimal element, t is the maximal one, and ?;> are two intermediate values that are
incomparable. This partial order may be intuitively understood as representing dierences in the
amount of truth of each element. We denote by ^ and _ the meet and join operations w.r.t 
t
(Hence, e.g., >_?= t). In the other partial order (denoted here by 
k
), ? is the minimal element,
> is the maximal one, and t; f are two intermediate values. This partial order intuitively represents
dierences in the amount of knowledge (or information) that each element exhibits. We denote by

 and  the meet and join operations w.r.t 
k
(Hence, e.g., tf=>).
The various semantical notions are dened on FOUR as natural generalizations of similar
classical ones: A valuation  is a function that assigns a truth value in FOUR to each atomic
formula. In what follows we shall sometime write  = fp : x; q : yg instead of (p) = x, (q) = y.
Any valuation is extended to complex formulae in the obvious way. The set of the four-valued
valuations is denoted by V
4
.
D= ft;>g is the set of the designated elements of FOUR, i.e., the set of elements in FOUR
that represent true assertions. Hence, we say that a valuation  satises a formula  i ( )2D.
Note that D is a prime lter in FOUR (w.r.t. both 
t
and 
k
) that consists of the elements that
are 
k
-greater than or equal to t. This corresponds to Belnap's observation that the designated
elements of FOUR should be those that are \at least true" (see [11, Page 36]).
A valuation that assigns a designated value to every clause in a logic program P is a model of P.
Next we dene a useful partial order on the elements of V
4
, using the partial order 
k
on
FOUR:
Denition 2.2
a) A valuation 
1
2 V
4
is k-smaller than another valuation 
2
2 V
4
if for every atomic formula
p, 
1
(p) 
k

2
(p).
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b) A valuation  2 V
4
is a k-minimal element in a set SV
4
if there is no other element in S
that is k-smaller that .
It is easy to see that Denition 2.2(a) induces a lattice structure on the set of the four-valued
valuations: V
4
=(V
4
;
k
). Another useful way of ordering the elements in V
4
is the following:
Denition 2.3 [5, 6]
a) A valuation 
1
2 V
4
is more consistent than another valuation 
2
2 V
4
if fp j 
1
(p)=>g 
fp j 
2
(p)=>g.
b) A valuation  2 V
4
is a most consistent element in a set SV
4
if there is no other element
in S that is more consistent that .
Clearly, the interesting cases of Denitions 2.2(b) and 2.3(b) are obtained when S is the set
of the models of the logic program P under consideration. Two important sets of models are
obtained in these cases: The k-minimal models of P, and the most consistent models of P. We
shall reconsider these models in what follows.
B. The meaning of the implication connective
Let P be a general logic program. The connectives that appear in the bodies or the heads of
the clauses in P, i.e.: conjunctions (;)
3
and negations (:), should be regarded, respectively, as the
greatest lower bound and the order-reversing operation w.r.t. the 
t
-partial order of FOUR.
4
This
corresponds to the natural extensions for the multiple-valued case of the 2-valued interpretations
of these connectives. However, as has already been observed in [9, 26], the implication connective
 of the program's clauses should not be taken as the material implication (denoted henceforth by
 -). This is so since, for instance, the intuitive meaning of f:p t; p :qg is dierent than the
intuitive meaning of f:p t; q :pg,
5
thus a plausible semantics for P cannot be `contrapositive'
w.r.t.  and :. Moreover, in the multy-valued setting, the material implication  - is not suitable
for representing entailments anymore. This is mainly due to the following reasons:
1. p - p does not always hold in the four-valued setting, since excluded-middle is not a four-
valued tautology (Note that (p_:p)=? when (p)=?).
2.  - does not have a deductive nature in FOUR. For instance, the fact that every four-valued
model of some conjunction Body is also a model of a literal l does not imply that l -Body
is true in every four-valued valuation (Consider, e.g., the case in which Body= l).
We therefore consider an alternative denition for the implication connective, according to
which it does function as an entailment in the four-valued setting:
3
Commas are used here also as a separator among clauses in the same program. This will not cause any ambiguity.
4
We shall discuss the semantics of the negation as failure operator not in a later stage.
5
Intuitively, in the former program there is no explicit information on the validity of q or :q, and so q should be
assigned ?, while in the latter program the condition in the rule that denes q is satised, and so this time q should
be assigned t.
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Denition 2.4 [5, 7] Let x; y 2 FOUR. Dene:
x y =
(
x if y2D
t otherwise
Note that on ft; fg the material implication and the new implication are identical, and both of
them are generalizations of the classical implication. However, unlike in the material implication,
the implication connective dened in 2.4 does preserve both properties of entailments that were
mentioned above.
In what follows we therefore use the implication connective of Denition 2.4 for representing the
entailments of the program's clauses. Note that the semantics of this implication is in accordance
with the following standard way of understanding entailments in logic programs:
Proposition 2.5 For every valuation 2V
4
, (l  Body)2D i either (l)2D or (Body) 62D.
Proof: Immediately follows from Denition 2.4. 2
2.3 The language and its extension to the rst-order case
The language of the logic programs considered here is based on the implication connective  , the
meaning of which was discussed in the previous section, conjunction that correspond to the 
t
-join
operator in FOUR, two negation operators : and not, and four propositional constants t, f, c,
u, that are respectively associated with the elements t, f , >, ? in FOUR. We therefore remain,
basically, on the propositional level. However, as rst-order clauses are considered as universally
quantied, rst order logic programs may be handled within our framework as well. We do so
by considering their ground instances; Every non-grounded clause is viewed as representing the
corresponding set of ground clauses, formed by substituting every variable that appear in this
clause with every possible element of the corresponding domain. Formally, let  be a ground
substitution from the variables of every clause C in P to the individuals of the domain of discourse,
D, of P. Then we shall consider programs of the form
P
D
= f(C) j C2P;  :var(C)!Dg:
In what follows we shall abbreviate P for P
D
.
3 Paraconsistent declarative semantics for logic programs
We are now ready to introduce our xpoint semantics for logic programs. First, we treat general
logic programs (I.e., programs without negation-as-failure), and then we consider extended logic
programs.
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3.1 Semantics for general logic programs
Denition 3.1 Given a general logic program P, dene for every i  1 and every literal l the
following valuations:

P
0
(l) = ?.
val
P
i
(l) =
(
t if 9l Body 2 P s.t. 
P
i 1
(Body) 2 D,
6
? otherwise.

P
i
(l) = val
P
i
(l):val
P
i
(l).
7
Also, for every propositional constant x 2 ft; f; c; ug that is associated with an element x 2
ft; f;>;?g in FOUR, we dene 
P
i
(x) = val
P
i
(x) = x (i = 0; 1; : : :).
Note that 
P
i
behaves as expected w.r.t. negation: Since for every x; y 2 FOUR, :(x y) =
:x :y, we have that :
P
i
(l) = :(val
P
i
(l) :val
P
i
(l)) = :val
P
i
(l) val
P
i
(l) = 
P
i
(l).
Proposition 3.2 Let P be a general logic program. Then the sequence 
P
0
; 
P
1
; 
P
2
; : : :, dened in
3.1, is 
k
-monotonic in V
4
.
Proof: Since the set D of the designated values is upwards-closed w.r.t. 
k
, it easily follows from
Denition 3.1 that for a given general logic program P, the sequences fval
P
i
g and f
P
i
g are both

k
-monotonic in i. 2
By Knaster-Tarski theorem [44], it follows from Proposition 3.2 that the sequence f
P
i
g has a

k
-least xpoint. Denote this xpoint by 
P
. An induced consequence relation j

may now be
dened as follows: P j

 i 
P
( )2D (Thus, a query  follows from a logic program P if 
P
( )
is designated).
Proposition 3.3 Let P be a general logic program. Then 
P
is the k-minimal four-valued model
of P. Moreover, it is at least as consistent as any other model of P, and the consequence relation
induced by it is paraconsistent.
Proof: See appendix A. 2
The last proposition implies, in particular, that 
P
is a most consistent model of P. As such,
it minimizes the amount of inconsistent belief in the set of clauses.
8
This is in accordance with the
intuition that while one has to deal with conicts in a nontrivial way, contradictory data corres-
ponds to inadequate information about the real world, and therefore it should be minimized (see
also [6] for a discussion on most consistent models of general theories).
6

P
j
is dened on conjunctive formulae in the usual way: 
P
j
(Body)=
V
l
i
2L(Body)

P
j
(l
i
). Thus, 
P
j
(Body) 2 D
i 8l
i
2L(Body) 
P
j
(l
i
)2D.
7
Recall that l is the complement of l, and  is the 
k
-join operation in FOUR.
8
Recall Denition 2.3.
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Proposition 3.3 also implies that 
P
minimizes the amount of knowledge that is pre-supposed,
i.e. it does not assume anything that is not really known. This property is further discussed in
Note 3.5 below.
Corollary 3.4 Let P be a general logic program. Then:
a) 
P
is the k-least model of P,
b) 
P
is a most consistent model of P,
c) 
P
is the k-minimal element among the most consistent models of P.
Proof: Immediately follows from Proposition 3.3 and its proof. 2
Note 3.5 Syntactically, normal logic programs are special cases of general logic programs. Still,
there is a semnatical diference between a set of rules viewed as a normal programs, and the same
set of rules viewed as a general (or extended) program. For instance, an absence of an atom p in
(most of the) semantics for normal logic programs means that p is false in the model. However,
in general or extended logic programs this can be infered from general rules that are stated in the
program itself (e.g., by adding rules for closed word assumption, see Example 3.18-a below), and
so the absence of p in a general logic program indicates that in the corresponding partial semantics
p is unknown.
9
For another example on the semantical dierences, consider the following (general)
program:
P = fp :q; q  tg:
Treated as a normal program, some of the 2-valued and the 3-valued xpoint semantics for P assign
t to q and f to p. According to those semantics the head of a clause program is associated with its
corresponding clause bodies, and therefore the truth value attached to a clause head should be the
same as the (least upper-bound of) the value(s) of its clause body(ies). This, however, is not the
case in our semantics, which assigns t to q and ? to p. This is justied by the fact that P is now
considered as a general logic program, and so had one wanted to identify the information regarding
p with that of its clause body, (s)he should have added to P also the converse implication, i.e.,
:p  q.
10
In the absence of such clause our four-valued semantics correctly indicates that one
should not jump to conclusion that p is false!
11
Once again, this example demonstrates our slogan: Our semantics always assumes as minimal
knowledge as reasonably possible. Thus, if one wishes to introduce more assumptions (e.g., to
apply Clark's completion [13, 32] to specic predicates), (s)he just has to add the appropriate
clauses. In the absence of such information the program may have other meaning than what is
understood by some of the 2-valued or 3-valued semantics for normal logic programs. Moreover,
since it is not always possible to distinguish in standard or normal logic programs among the
various possibilities oered by general (or extended) logic programs, such renements sometimes
9
See also a remark on this matter in [26, Pages 591{592].
10
Indeed, as shown in Example 3.10, our 4-valued xpoint semantics of P [ f:p qg assigns t to q and f to p.
11
This is so since the condition of the rule that denes p does not hold, and so one cannot infer anything meaningful
about p.
11
cannot even be captured within the 2-valued or the 3-valued semantics for standard/normal logic
programs!
In the reminder of this section we show that in certain cases it is possible to restore from our
4-valued xpoint formalism some other 2-valued or 3-valued xpoint formalisms, if so one wishes.
Proposition 3.6 Let P be a positive logic program, and let P' be the positive program obtained
from P by replacing every implication connective by a material implication. Denote by 
P
f=?
the
valuation that is obtained from 
P
by changing the ?-assignments to f -assignments (I.e., for every
atom p, if 
P
(p)=? then 
P
f=?
(p)=f). Then:
1. P and P
0
have the same classical models (and thus the same least Herbrand model), and
2. 
P
f=?
is the (unique) 2-valued minimal Herbrand model of P and P'.
Proof: See appendix A. 2
Note 3.7 The process of restoring Fitting's 
k
-minimal 3-valued Kripke/Kleene semantics for
normal logic programs [18] is somewhat more complicated than the process of restoring the 2-
valued semantics of positive logic programs, described in Proposition 3.6 above. Note, however,
that if P is a normal logic program, the following properties hold:
1. For every atom p, 
P
(p)2ft;?g.
(Proof: For every i and p, val
i
(p)2 ft;?g, and since P is a normal program, val
i
(:p) =?.
Thus, for every i, 
P
i
(p)=val
i
(p)2ft;?g, and so 
P
(p)2ft;?g as well).
2. 
P

k
	
P
, where 	
P
is the 
k
-least xpoint of Fitting's operator for P.
(Proof: By the fact that 	
P
is a model of P and 
P
is the 
k
-least model of P
12
).
It follows, therefore, that 
P
can be viewed as an \approximation" of 	
P
: If 
P
assigns t to some
atomic formulae, then so is 	
P
, and if 
P
assigns ? to some atom, then 	
P
assigns either ? or f
to this atom. Thus, in order to restore from 
P
Fitting's 3-valued xpoint semantics for P, it is
possible to apply Fitting's operator on 
P
(rather than to start the iterations with a valuation that
assigns ? to every atom), and then to proceed until a xpoint is reached. This xpoint coincides
with Fitting 3-valued Kripke/Kleene semantics for P.
The next proposition considers some more specic cases in which there is an alternative way
of computing Fitting's 3-valued semantics from our 4-valued semantics.
Denition 3.8 Given a normal logic program P, consider the following general logic program:
P

= P [ f:p l j p Body 2 P; 
P
(p) = ?; l 2 L(Body)g [
f:p t j p f 2 P; 
P
(p) = ?g
12
Note that according to our semantics, the set of models of P contains the set of models w.r.t. Fitting's semantics.
Thus (as illustrated in Note 3.5), although 	
P
is the 
k
-least model in Fitting's semantics, it is not necessarily the

k
-least one in our case.
12
Proposition 3.9 Let P be a normal logic program in which each atomic formula appears at most
once in a clause head. Let also 	
P
be Fitting xpoint semantics for P. Then 	
P
=
P

.
Proof: See appendix A. 2
Example 3.10 Consider again the logic program P, given in Note 3.5. By Denition 3.8,
P

= fp :q; :p q; q  tg
By Proposition 3.9, our four-valued semantics for P

is the same as that of Fitting 3-valued xpoint
operator for P. In both of them q is assigned t, and p is assigned f .
Note 3.11 The requirement in Proposition 3.9 that every atomic formula should not appear more
than once in a clause head is indeed necessary. To see that consider, e.g., the following program:
P = fq  p; q  :r; r tg:
Then P

=P [ f:q :p; :q rg, and while 	
P
(q)=?, we have that 
P

(q)=f .
3.2 Semantics for extended logic programs
In this section we extend the xpoint semantics for general logic programs, considered in the pre-
vious section, to extended logic programs. So now, in addition to the explicit negation :, the
negation-as-failure operator not may also appear in the clauses bodies.
One way of understanding not in the four-valued setting is the following: If we don't know
anything about p, i.e. we cannot prove either p or :p, then we cannot say anything about not p
as well. Otherwise, if p has a designated value in the intended semantics (i.e., p is provable), then
not p does not hold, and if p does not have a designated value (i.e., it is not provable), then not p
holds. It follows, then, that not t = f , not > = f , not f = t, and not ? = ?.
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This interpretation of not is a natural generalization to the four-valued case of the way not is
interpreted by the well-founded semantics [46]. We thus give semantics to logic programs in which
not may appear in the clause bodies by using a 3-valued transformation, similar to that of the
well-founded semantics, for reducing extended logic programs to general logic programs. Then we
use the machinery of the previous section for giving semantics to the general logic programs that
are obtained. Below we formalize this idea.
Denition 3.12 Let  be a four-valued valuation. The set S

of literals that is associated with 
is the smallest set that satises the following conditions:
14
If (l)= t then l2S

; if (l)=f then l2S

; if (l)=> then fl; lgS

:
13
It is interesting to note that in this interpretation, not may be represented as a conjunction of two other negation
operators: not p = :p^p, where p is an abbreviation of p!f , i.e., p=f if p2D, and p= t if p 62D.
14
Such sets are sometimes called answer sets (for ). We shall not use this terminology here, since it is usual to
require that if an answer set contains a pair of complementary literals, then it should contain every literal. Since our
formalism does not reduce to triviality in the presence of inconsistent information, this requirement should obviously
not hold here.
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Obviously, one can dene the converse transformation as well: A four-valued valuation 
S
may be
constructed from a set S of literals as follows: For every atom p,

S
(p) =
8
>
<
>
:
t if p2S and :p 62S
f if p 62S and :p2S
> if p2S and :p2S
? if p 62S and :p 62S
Denition 3.13 Let P be an extended program and let S be a set of literals. The reduction of
P w.r.t. S is the general logic program P #S, obtained from P as follows:
1. Each clause that has a condition of the form not l for some l2S, is deleted from P.
2. Every occurrence of not l, where l 2 S, is eliminated from the (bodies of the) remaining
clauses.
15
3. Every occurrence of not l in the (bodies of the) remaining clauses is replaced by the propos-
itional constant u.
16
Now we are ready to dene our xpoint semantics for extended logic programs. Recall that 
P
denotes the xpoint semantics for a general logic program P.
Denition 3.14 A valuation 2V
4
is an adequate solution for an extended logic program P, if
it coincides with the xpoint semantics of the general logic program obtained by reducing P w.r.t.
the set that is associated with . In other words,  is an adequate solution for P i
 = 
P#S

:
Note 3.15 If the only negation operator that appears in P is :, then P is a general logic program,
and so its unique adequate solution is 
P
. It follows, in particular, that the notion of adequate
solutions of extended logic programs is a generalization of the denition of xpoint semantics for
general logic programs.
Proposition 3.16 An adequate solution for P is a model of P.
Proof: Let  be an adequate solution for P, and let C = l Body be some extended clause in P.
We show that (C)2D by an induction on the number of appearances of the operator not in Body.
If not does not appear in Body, then C is a general clause. In this case (C)2D by Proposition
3.3 and Note 3.15. Otherwise, Body = Body
0
; not l
0
. Now,
 If (l
0
)2D then (not l
0
)=f , thus (Body)=f , and so (C)2D.
 If (l
0
)=f , (not l
0
)= t, so (C)=(l Body
0
). By induction hypothesis (l Body
0
)2D.
15
If a clause body becomes empty by this transformation, we treat this body as if it consists of the propositional
constant t.
16
Note that for such an l, necessarily l 62S and l 62S.
14
 If (l
0
)=? then (not l
0
)=?. Thus (Body)=(Body
0
)^? 62D, and again (C)2D. 2
As it is shown in Example 3.18 below, an extended logic program may have more than one
adequate solution, and so one may use dierent preference criteria for choosing the best solutions
among the adequate ones. In the case of general logic programs we have chosen 
k
-minimization
as the criterion for prefering the \best" model among the xpoint valuations. This was justied by
the fact that general logic programs may contain contradictory data, and so we want to minimize
the redundant information as much as possible. In the present case we rather use the opposite
methodology: Since the negation-as-failure operator corresponds to incomplete information, we are
dealing here with a lack of data, so this time we should try to restrict the eect of the negation-as-
failure operator only to those cases in which indeed there is not enough data available. It follows,
therefore, that now we should seek for a maximal knowledge (among the adequate solutions).
Denition 3.17  is a most adequate model of P if it is a 
k
-maximal adequate solution for P.
17
Example 3.18
1. P = f:p not pg.
Intuitively, P represents a closed word assumption (CWA, [42]) regarding p: In the absence
of any evidence for p, assume that :p holds. P has two adequate solutions 
1
=fp :?g and

2
=fp :fg. But 
2
>
k

1
, and so 
2
is the most adequate model of P.
2. P = fp not pg.
The most adequate model here is (p) = ?. This indeed seems to be the only reasonable
interpretation here, and it coincides with the well-founded model [46] of P (when P is viewed
as a standard logic program). Two-valued semantics, such as Gelfond-Lifschitz stable model
semantics [25], do not provide any model for P.
3. [36, Example 2] P = fp t; :p not qg.
This program has two adequate solutions: 
1
=fp : t; q :?g and 
2
=fp :>; q :fg. The most
adequate model here is 
2
. It reects our expectation that since q does not follow from P,
the knowledge about p is contradictory. Note that according to the semantics given in [36],
P does not have any model, since it contains a contradictory information.
We postpone to a later stage (Section 5) some further discussions on the most adequate models
and other formalisms for giving semantics to extended logic programs. First we complete the
presentation of our formalism also for the prioritized case.
4 Prioritized logic programs
4.1 Motivation
As Proposition 3.3 and Corollary 3.4 imply, the four-valued xpoint semantics considered in the
previous section has several appealing properties. However, there might be cases in which one
17
I.e.,  is an adequate solution for P and there is no other adequate solution for P that is strictly 
k
-bigger than
. Note also that by Proposition 3.16,  is indeed a model of P.
15
would like to rene the inference mechanism induced by this xpoint. To see this, consider the
following example.
Example 4.1 (Tweety dilemma) Consider the following well-known logic program:
fly(x) bird(x) :reptile(x) bird(x) bird(x) penguin(x)
:fly(x) penguin(x) bird(Tweety) t penguin(Tweety) t
Denote the above program by P. Then:

P
(bird(Tweety)) = t, 
P
(penguin(Tweety)) = t,

P
(reptile(Tweety)) = f , 
P
(has feathers(Tweety)) = ?,

P
(fly(Tweety)) = >.
While the truth values that are assigned to bird(Tweety), penguin(Tweety), reptile(Tweety) and
has feathers(Tweety) match the intuitive expectations,
18
one usually tends to conclude from P
that Tweety cannot y. However, this conclusion is based on some further, implicit knowledge,
that is not represented in the program. Such knowledge is, e.g., the fact that the rule \birds can
y" has exceptions, which should \override" the default rule. Another kind of knowledge that is
not encoded in this program is the fact that the information that Tweety is a penguin is more
specic than the statement that it is a bird, therefore the former data should have a higher priority
than the latter one, in case of \collisions" between the two.
The above inaccurate conclusion about the ying ability of Tweety is therefore an outcome
of the limited way knowledge is represented here rather than a consequence of a faulty reasoning
process. A general method to improve knowledge representation is to provide a way to prefer a
certain data over the other. In example 4.1, for instance, such mechanism will allow us to indicate
that the clause that states that \penguins cannot y" should get a precedence over the one that
states that \birds can y".
Several methodologies for making such preferences have been proposed in the literature. In [30],
for instance, rules with negative conclusions are viewed as representing exceptions of rules with
the positive counterparts as their conclusions. As such, the former rules are given higher priorities
over the latter rules. Thus, for instance, in the semantics of [30] for P=f:p t; p not qg, p is
false (Cf. Example 3.18, Item 3).
In the formalism, proposed by Pereira et al. in [37], preferences of dierent rules are encoded
within the language itself. According to this approach the conict regarding the ying ability of
Tweety in Example 4.1 is resolved by stating that birds can y unless they \abnormal birds". I.e.,
the rule fly(x) bird(x) in the program of Example 4.1 is replaced by the following two rules:
fly(x) bird(x); not abnormal bird(x) abnormal bird(x) bird(x);:fly(x)
18
The assignment of ? to has feathers(Tweety) is justied by the fact that nothing is mentioned in the program
about the property \has feathers".
16
In the same paper, Pereira et al. also propose to associate a dierent 'label' to each program
rule, and to insert this label as another condition to the body of the rule. This enables an easy
way to represent a hierarchy of rules in the language itself. For instance, the fact that under the
conditions specied in Body one should apply a rule labelled by l
1
instead of a rule labelled by l
2
,
is encoded by the following special preference rule: :l
2
 Body; l
1
.
The formalisms mentioned above, although being elegant ones, have their own limitations.
First, they rule out any representation of contradictions in the reasoner's belief. Such contradic-
tions do occur in practical problems, and it may be useful to use a methodology to trace them and
to represent their eect on the obtained semantics. Second, as already observed in [37], because
of the inherent asymmetry in the representation of the hierarchy of exceptions, each time that
exception to an exception is made, previous rules in the program should be changed. Third, the
rule labelling and the need to maintain the preferences and the exceptions with special additional
rules, require a lot of overhead in the level of knowledge representation; In practical cases this
might yield awkward programs, in which it would be dicult to grasp the essence from the whole
data.
Here we consider another way of making preferences among programs clauses, which has a
more quantitative nature. The idea is to attach, in a meta-language, dierent priorities to dierent
clauses. We do so by assigning to every clause a `condence factor' that reects its relative priority
over the other clauses. For this, we consider algebraic structures that generalize Belnap's four-
valued structure. In particular, we extend the four-valued semantics to a more general semantics
that is based on arbitrarily many truth values. In the next section we review the basic notions that
are related to these structures, and in Section 4.3 we use them for giving semantics to prioritized
logic programs.
4.2 Bilattices and logical bilattices { An overview
Denition 4.2 [27, 28] A bilattice is a structure B = (B;
t
;
k
;:) such that B is a nonempty
set containing at least two elements, (B;
t
) and (B;
k
) are complete lattices, and : is a unary
operation on B that has the following properties: (i) if a 
t
b then :a 
t
:b, (ii) if a 
k
b then
:a 
k
:b, (iii) ::a = a.
The original motivation of Ginsberg for using bilattices was to provide a uniform approach for
a diversity of applications in articial intelligence. In particular, he treated rst order theories
and their consequences, truth maintenance systems, and formalisms for default reasoning. The
algebraic structure of bilattices has been further investigated by Fitting and Avron [8, 20, 23].
In a series of paper Fitting has also shown that bilattices are very useful tools for providing se-
mantics for logic programs: He proposed an extension of Smullyan's tableaux-style proof method
to bilattice-valued programs, and showed that this method is sound and complete with respect to
a natural generalization of van-Emden and Kowalski's operator [19, 21]. Fitting also introduced
a multy-valued xpoint operator for providing bilattice-based stable models and well-founded se-
mantics for logic programs [22]. A well-founded semantics for logic programs that is based on a
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specic bilattice (denote here by NINE, see Figure 2 below) is considered also in [17]. Bilattices
have also been found useful for model-based diagnostics [28], computational linguistics [35], reas-
oning with inconsistent knowledge-bases [5, 43], and processing of distributed knowledge [34].
As in the four-valued case, we shall continue to denote by ^;_;: the meet, join, and negation
operations w.r.t. 
t
, and by 
; the meet and the join operations w.r.t. 
k
. The 
t
-maximal
(respectively, 
t
-minimal) element is denoted by t (respectively, f), and the 
k
-maximal (respect-
ively, 
k
-minimal) element is denoted by > (respectively, ?).
Denition 4.3 [5] Let B=(B;
t
;
k
;:) be a bilattice.
a) A bilter of B is a nonempty proper subset DB, such that:
(i) a^b2D i a2D and b2D, (ii) a
b2D i a2D and b2D.
b) A bilter D is called prime, if it also satises the following conditions:
(i) a_b2D i a2D or b2D, (ii) ab2D i a2D or b2D.
Clearly, for every prime bilter D we have that t;>2D, while f;?62D.
Denition 4.4 [5] A logical bilattice is a pair (B;D), in which B is a bilattice and D is a prime
bilter of B.
The basic semantical notions of the four-valued case can easily be extended to the bilattice-
valued case. For instance, given a logical bilattice (B;D), the notions of valuations, models, etc.
are the same as in the four-valued case. The denitions of the implication connective  also
remains the same: For every x; y;2B the value of x y is x if y 2D, and it is t otherwise. The
only dierence is that instead of taking D = ft;>g as the set of the designated values, we now
allow that any prime bilter in B would be the set of the designated values.
The minimal logical bilattice is FOUR with D = ft;>g. Next we describe a general way of
constructing logical bilattices with arbitrarily many elements:
Denition 4.5 [28] Let (L,
L
) be a complete lattice. The structure LL = (LL, 
t
, 
k
, :)
is dened as follows:
(y
1
; y
2
) 
t
(x
1
; x
2
) i y
1

L
x
1
and y
2

L
x
2
,
(y
1
; y
2
) 
k
(x
1
; x
2
) i y
1

L
x
1
and y
2

L
x
2
,
:(x
1
; x
2
) = (x
2
; x
1
).
A pair (x; y)2L  L may intuitively be understood so that x represents the amount of belief
for some assertion, and y is the amount of belief against it.
Notation 4.6 Let (x; y)2L L. Denote: [(x; y)]
T
= x and [(x; y)]
F
= y.
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Example 4.7 Let T WO=(f0; 1g; 0<1g be the classical (two-valued) lattice. Then in the nota-
tions of Denition 4.5, Belnap four-valued bilattice FOUR is isomorphic to T WOTWO by the
following isomorphism: t corresponds to (1; 0), f corresponds to (0; 1), ? corresponds to (0; 0),
and > corresponds to (1; 1).
Proposition 4.8 [19, 28] For every complete lattice (L,
L
), the structure LL is a bilattice.
Outline of proof: Given a lattice L with a meet operation u and a join operation t, the bilattice
operations are dened as follows:
(x
1
; y
1
)_(x
2
; y
2
)=(x
1
tx
2
; y
1
uy
2
); (x
1
; y
1
)^(x
2
; y
2
)=(x
1
ux
2
; y
1
ty
2
);
(x
1
; y
1
)(x
2
; y
2
)=(x
1
tx
2
; y
1
ty
2
); (x
1
; y
1
)
(x
2
; y
2
)=(x
1
ux
2
; y
1
uy
2
);
:(x; y)=(y; x).
It is easy to verify that for every two elements x; y;2 LL, x _ y (respectively, x ^ y) is the
least upper bound (respectively, the greatest lower bound) of x and y w.r.t. the 
t
-partial order
(Denition 4.5). Similarly, x  y (respectively, x 
 y) is the least upper bound (respectively, the
greatest lower bound) of x and y w.r.t. the 
k
-partial order (Denition 4.5), and : satises all
the requirements from a negation operator (Denition 4.2). 2
Proposition 4.9 [5] Let (L,
L
) be a complete lattice with a maximal element, m. Then the
smallest (prime) bilter in LL is of the form f(m;x) j x2Lg. We shall denote this bilter by
D
LL
.
Corollary 4.10 Let (L,
L
) be a complete bounded lattice. Then
a) (LL;D
LL
) is a logical bilattice.
b) Every complete bounded lattice can be turned into a logical bilattice.
Proof: Part (a) follows from Propositions 4.8 and 4.9. Part (b) follows from part (a). 2
4.3 Bilattice-based semantics for prioritized logic programs
For giving semantics to prioritized logic programs, we have found it useful to concentrate on bil-
attices of the form f0; 1; : : : ;mgf0; 1; : : : ;mg. We shall denote these bilattices by B
m
.
As in the non-prioritized case, we start by considering a semantics to prioritized logic programs
without negation-as-failure, and then consider the general case.
Denition 4.11 An m-prioritized general logic program is a set of quantitative general clauses,
i.e., a set of formulae of the form l
n
 Body, where l is a literal, Body is a conjunction of literals,
and n is a number between 1 and m.
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The quantitative values of the clauses (the n's) may be intuitively understood as representing
\condence factors" or \threshold values" of (the belief in) the corresponding clauses. The idea is
that a head of a quantitative clause is evaluated only if there is a \sucient" evidence in favour
of the clause's body, and the evidence for the complement of the clause head does not exceed the
clause's threshold value. Next we formalize this intuition:
Denition 4.12 Given a logical bilattice (B
m
;D) and an m-prioritized general logic program P,
consider for every literal l and i1 the following functions:

P
0
(l) = val
P
0
(l) = ?.
threshold
P
i
(l) = lub

k
f
P
i 1
(Body) j l
n
 Body 2 Pg.
19
belief
P
i
(l) = lub

k
f
P
i 1
(Body) j l
n
 Body 2 P; [threshold
P
i
(l)]
T
 ng.
20
val
P
i
(l) = lub

k
(val
P
i 1
(l); belief
P
i
(l)).

P
i
(l) = ([val
P
i
(l)]
T
; [val
P
i
(l)]
T
).
Again, for every propositional constant x that corresponds to an element x 2 B
m
we dene, for
every i0, 
P
i
(x) = val
P
i
(x) = x.
In each iteration we therefore compute, for each literal, its `threshold value', which is the least
upper bound (w.r.t. 
k
) of the values attached to the relevant clause bodies at the previous
iteration.
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Then we compute the amount the `belief' in a certain literal l during the current
iteration. Again, the required value obtains by considering the relevant clause bodies, but this
time we take into account only those clauses with a `suciently high' condence factor, i.e., those
clauses with l as their head, and with a condence value that is not smaller than the threshold
value of l's complement. val
P
i
() is a 
k
-monotonic function that is based on these belief values, and
nally | as in the four-valued case | we use val
P
i
() for constructing the 
k
-monotonic sequence
of valuations 
P
i
that yields, eventually, the xpoint semantics for P.
Note 4.13 As in the four-valued case, we have that for every i and l, 
P
i
(l) = :
P
i
(l).
As the next proposition shows, the semantics for non-prioritized programs (Denition 3.1) is a
particular case of the semantics for prioritized programs (Denition 4.12).
Proposition 4.14 Let P be a general logic program, and let P
0
be the 1-prioritized logic program
obtained from P by assigning the quantitative factor n=1 to every general clause in P. Then, for
every i, 
P
i
(dened in 3.1) is the same as 
P
0
i
(dened in 4.12).
Proof: See appendix A. 2
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If there is no clause of the form l
n
 Body in P, dene threshold
P
i
(l)=?.
20
If no clause of the form l
n
 Body is in P, or [threshold
P
i
(l)]
T
> maxfn j l
n
 Body2Pg, dene belief
P
i
(l)=?.
21
This value may be intuitively understood as an `a-priory' belief in the literal under consideration, since the
condence factors of the clauses are not taken into account in the calculation of this value.
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As in the four-valued case, the partial order 
k
on B can be used for dening a partial order on
the set V
B
of the B-valued valuations: A valuation 
1
2 V
B
is k-smaller than another valuation

2
2 V
B
(notation: 
1
<
k

2
) if 
1
(p) 
k

2
(p) for every atom p. The pair V
B
= (V
B
;
k
) is clearly
a lattice. Moreover,
Proposition 4.15 Let P be an m-prioritized general logic program, and let B = f0; 1; : : : ;mg 
f0; 1 : : : ;mg. The sequence 
P
0
; 
P
1
; 
P
2
; : : : is 
k
-monotonic in V
B
.
Proof: By denition 4.12, for every i 1 and every literal l, val
i+1
(l)
k
val
i
(l). Thus, for every
i0 and every l, 
P
i+1
(l)
k

P
i
(l), and so 
P
i+1

k

P
i
. 2
Again, by Knaster-Tarski theorem [44], it follows that f
P
i
g has a 
k
-least xpoint. We denote
it by 
P
.
The following result is an immediate consequence of Proposition 4.14.
Proposition 4.16 Let P be a general logic program, and let P
0
be the 1-prioritized program
obtained from P by setting n = 1 as the quantitative factor of every general clause in P. Then 
P
(the 
k
-least xpoint of the 
P
i
-sequence, dened in 3.1) is the same as 
P
0
(the 
k
-least xpoint
of the 
P
0
i
-sequence, dened in 4.12).
We now generalize our formalism to m-prioritized extended logic programs. We do so in a way
which is completely analogous to the way we generalized the xpoint semantics for non-prioritized
general logic program to non-prioritized extended logic programs. I.e., we use a transformation like
that of the well-founded semantics to eliminate the negation-as-failure operators from the clauses
bodies. What remains is an m-prioritized general logic programs, to which we give semantics in
the way described above. The following denitions formalize this process.
Denition 4.17 Anm-prioritized extended logic program is a set of quantitative extended clauses,
i.e.: a set of formulae of the form l
n
 Body, where l is a literal, Body is a conjunction of extended
literals, and n is a number between 1 and m.
Denition 4.18 Let P be an m-prioritized extended logic program.
a) A valuation 2V
4
is an adequate solution for P, if it coincides with the xpoint semantics
of the m-prioritized general logic program obtained by reducing P w.r.t. the set that is
associated with . I.e.,  = 
P#S

.
b) A most adequate model of P is a 
k
-maximal adequate solution for P.
By Proposition 4.14 and Denition 4.18 we have the following result:
Proposition 4.19 Let P be an extended logic program, and let P
0
be the 1-prioritized extended
logic program obtained from P by assigning the quantitative factor n=1 to every extended clause
in P. Then  is an adequate solution for P (according to Denition 3.14) i it is an adequate
solution for P
0
(according to Denition 4.18).
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4.4 Tweety dilemma, revisited
Consider again the logic program for Tweety dilemma, given in Example 4.1. The corresponding
1-prioritized program is the following:
P
1
=
(
fly(x)
1
 bird(x) :reptile(x)
1
 bird(x) bird(x)
1
 penguin(x)
:fly(x)
1
 penguin(x) bird(Tweety)
1
 t penguin(Tweety)
1
 t
Since P
1
is a \at" program (each clause is assigned the same priority), then by Proposition 4.16
its xpoint is the same as in the non-prioritized case. In particular, still 
P
1
(fly(Tweety)) = >.
However, now it is possible to give dierent precedence to dierent clauses. As we have noted
during the previous discussion on this example, the clause bird(x)  penguin(x) describes only
a default property of birds, while the other clauses of the program describe rules that do not have
exceptions. We therefore attach to bird(x)  penguin(x) a lower priority (condence factor)
than the other assertions. The logic program that is obtained is the following:
P
2
=
(
fly(x)
1
 bird(x) :reptile(x)
2
 bird(x) bird(x)
2
 penguin(x)
:fly(x)
2
 penguin(x) bird(Tweety)
2
 t penguin(Tweety)
2
 t
The corresponding bilattice, NINE = f0; 1; 2gf0; 1; 2g is displayed in Figure 2 (see also [5, 6, 43]).
We abbreviate its elements with the following notations:
?=(0; 0) df=(0; 1) dt=(1; 0) f=(0; 2) t=(2; 0)
d>=(1; 1) of=(1; 2) ot=(2; 1) >=(2; 2)
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Figure 2: NINE
Note that NINE has two prime bilters: D
t
= fx j x 
k
tg and D
dt
= fx j x 
k
dtg. Con-
sequently, two corresponding logical bilattices may be considered: NINE
t
= (NINE;D
t
) and
NINE
dt
=(NINE;D
dt
). As D
t
D
dt
, the former logical bilattice may be used for a more skeptical
22
reasoning process, while the latter one provides a more liberal approach for a query evaluation (we
shall demonstrate this in what follows).
Table 1 describes the iterative construction of 
P
2
.
Table 1: iterative construction of 
P
2
function bird :bird penguin :penguin fly :fly reptile :reptile
threshold
1
t ? t ? ? ? ? ?
belief
1
t ? t ? ? ? ? ?
val
1
t ? t ? ? ? ? ?

1
t f t f ? ? ? ?
threshold
2
t ? t ? t t ? t
belief
2
t ? t ? ? t ? t
val
2
t ? t ? ? t ? t

2
t f t f f t f t
It is easy to see that for every i2, 
P
2
i+1
=
P
2
i
, thus the 
k
-least xpoint of P
2
is the following:

P
2
(bird(Tweety)) = t, 
P
2
(penguin(Tweety)) = t,

P
2
(reptile(Tweety)) = f , 
P
2
(has feathers(Tweety)) = ?,

P
2
(fly(Tweety)) = f .
So the intuitive conclusion regarding the ying ability of Tweety is obtained, and the other literal
conclusions remain as in the non-prioritized case, as expected.
It is interesting to note that our approach supports a very exible process of belief revision.
To see this, suppose that another datum arrives, and we are informed that Tweety might y after
all. Suppose further that our resource is not so sure about this information or that this resource is
not a reliable one. We therefore have two options to express this uncertainty in our program: One
option is to attach to the new information a low priority. Alternatively, we can put an attenuation
factor in the clause body. The impact of the former option is that in case of conicts we prefer
the complementary information and ignore the new data altogether, while the eect of the latter
option is that we always consider the new data, but give it a lower weight when we draw our
conclusions. According to the the second option the modied program may be the following:
22
P
3
= P
2
[ f fly(Tweety)
2
 dt g
Table 2 describes the iterative construction of 
P
3
.
22
Where dt is a propositional constant that corresponds to the truth value dt in NINE (intuitively understood as
\true by default").
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Table 2: iterative construction of 
P
3
function bird :bird penguin :penguin fly :fly reptile :reptile
threshold
1
t ? t ? dt ? ? ?
belief
1
t ? t ? dt ? ? ?
val
1
t ? t ? dt ? ? ?

1
t f t f dt df ? ?
threshold
2
t ? t ? t t ? t
belief
2
t ? t ? dt t ? t
val
2
t ? t ? dt t ? t

2
t f t f of ot f t
Again, after two iterations we reach a xpoint, in which 
P
3
(fly(Tweety)) = of . The inter-
pretation of this result depends on the logical bilattice under consideration (i.e., the choice of the
prime bilter in NINE):
 In NINE
ot
the xpoint values of fly(Tweety) and of :fly(Tweety) are both designated.
This means that the new data, although being somewhat unreliable, caused an inconsistent
belief regarding the ying abilities of Tweety. Nevertheless, the fact that fly(Tweety) is
assigned of rather than > reects the fact that P
3
contains more evidence in favour of
:fly(Tweety) rather than in favour of fly(Tweety).
 In NINE
t
the xpoint value of :fly(Tweety) is designated, while the xpoint value of
fly(Tweety) is not. This means that despite the new datum we actually still believe that
Tweety cannot y. However, because of the new information, we are less certain than before
(thus fly(Tweety) is assigned of rather than f).
5 Some concluding remarks
We conclude with a summary of the main properties of the formalizms considered here, and some
further remarks regarding related semantics.
Reasoning with incomplete and inconsistent data
One of the main drawbacks of some of the xpoint semantics for extended logic program (like
those in [26] and [36]) is that they are reduced to triviality in the presence of contradictions. As
such, these formalisms inherit one of the well-known shortcomings of classical logic. We do be-
lieve that since inconsistent knowledge can and may be represented in extended logic programs, a
plausible semantics for such programs should be able to handle inconsistent situations in a non-
trivial way. That is, one should be able to draw meaningful conclusions (and reject others) despite
the inconsistency. The xpoint semantics considered here has such capabilities: It pinpoints on
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the inconsistent and the incomplete parts of the data, and regards the rest of the information as
classically consistent.
Consider, for instance, the following program, which is an extended variant of the program
considered in Example 1.3 (see also item 3 of Example 3.18):
P = f p t :p not q r
1
 t r
2
 not :r
1
:r
3
 r
1
;:r
2
g
This program provides a complete information regarding the truth or the falsity of r
i
, i=1; 2; 3.
Moreover, the information regarding these atoms is not aected by either p, q, or their negations.
The fact that the data regarding q is incomplete and the data regarding p is inconsistent should
be localized (i.e., restricted only to those literals whose denitions depend on p or q), and it should
not aect the values of the r
i
's. Thus, the inconsistent data in P should not spoil the whole
piece of information represented in this program. The xpoint semantics that was considered here
follows these guidelines; The unique adequate solution for P (and so its most adequate model) is
the following:

P
= f p :>; q :?; r
1
: t; r
2
: t; r
3
:f g
It follows that the complete information in P (the one that concerns with r
i
, i=1; 2; 3) is preserved.
In addition, the reasoner may realize that the data about p is contradictory, and the data about q
is incomplete.
Relating negative data to its positive counterpart
Another major dierence between the semantics introduced here and some other semantics for
extended logic programs (e.g, [24, 26, 30, 41]) concerns with the way a negative data is related to
its positive counterpart. While the formalizms of [24, 26, 30, 41] treat p and :p as two dierent
atomic formulae, we preserve the relation between an atomic formula and its negated atom. To
see the importance of this, consider the following program (also considered in [9, Example 3.3.6]
and [36, Example 1]):
P = f p not q q  not p :p t g
According to the approaches that treat :p as (a strange way of writing) an atomic formula, the
well-founded semantics would assign here t to :p, ? to p, and ? to q. So even though P is
classically consistent, the distinction between p and :p causes a counter-intuitive result here. In
contrast, our approach yields a semantics that seems to reect the intuitive expectation in this
case: The unique adequate solution for P assigns f to p and t to q.
For another example, consider the following logic program of [36, Example 6]:
P = f r  not q q  not p p not p :q  t g
The unique adequate solution for P (and so its most adequate model) is fp :?; q :f; r : tg (which
is the same as the one that is obtained in [36]). By considering :q as a new atom, this program
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would have a single extended stable model, in which :q is true and all the other atomic formulae
(p; q; r) are unknown. This seems to be a counter-intuitive result in this case, since one expects
here that r would follow from P.
Paraconsistent and coherent approaches to inconsistency
The formalisms that we have described here for giving semantics to extended logic programs
are paraconsistent in nature. I.e., they accept contradictions within the theory and try to cope
with them. Another common approach to handle contradictions (sometimes called coherent or
conservative [12, 47]) rst detects and eliminates the inconsistent part of the theory. Then, when
consistency is restored, classical logic is used for drawing plausible conclusions from the \recovered"
data. In [30], for instance, clauses with negative literals in their heads are getting a higher priority
than clauses with positive literals in their head. The latter ones are ignored in case of contradic-
tions with their negated counterparts. This approach assures a contradictions-free semantics [30,
Theorem 2]. In [37] contradictions are excluded already in the level of knowledge representation,
since clauses for default rules have the form l Body; not l. Thus, in order to derive l, one has
to verify rst that its complement, l, is not provable. Other coherent formalisms for managing
inconsistent information are considered, e.g., in [2, 3, 4, 12, 16].
Flexible belief revision
Consider the following example (anonymous author):
\A man fell from a plane. Fortunately, he was wearing a parachute. Unfortunately,
the parachute didn't open. Fortunately, he fell from the plane at a low altitude over a
large haystack. Unfortunately, there was a pitchfork in the haystack. Fortunately, he
missed the pitchfork. Unfortunately, he missed the haystack : : :".
After each sentence in this example there is a tendency to jump back and forth between opposite
conclusions regarding the ultimate fate of the skydriver. In Tweety dilemma, considered in Section
4.4, we faced the same phenomenon when we had to change our mind several times regarding
Tweety ability to y in light of the new data that has arrived. Indeed, in the notations used in
that section,
 fly(Tweety) follows from P
2
n fpenguin(Tweety)
2
 tg,
 fly(Tweety) does not follow from P
2
,
 fly(Tweety) does not follow from P
2
[ffly(Tweety)
2
 dtg w.r.t. NINE
t
(i.e., in a skeptical
reasoning), and it does follow from P
2
[ffly(Tweety)
2
 dtg w.r.t. NINE
ot
(i.e., in a more
liberal reasoning).
The need to alter the set of conclusions according to an input that is frequently modied is not
an unusual phenomenon in commonsense reasoning in general and logic programming in particular.
Thus, the plausibility of dierent formalisms in these areas is often determined by the way they
26
handle revised information. As demonstrated in Section 4.4, the exibility of process for belief
revision in our case is reected both on the semantical level (dierent choices of logical bilattices
yield dierent conclusions), and on the syntactical level (by enhancing the expressive power of the
logic programs under consideration, thus allowing various ways to represent knowledge, either in
the program language itself, or in a meta-language that reects the reasoner's preferences).
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Appendix A. Proofs
Proposition 3.3: Let P be a general logic program. Then 
P
is the k-minimal four-valued model
of P. Moreover, it is at least as consistent as any other model of P, and the consequence relation
induced by it is paraconsistent.
Proof: This proposition contains several claims. We divide the proof accordingly.
1. 
P
is a model of P:
Suppose not. Then there is a clause l Body in P s.t. 
P
(Body) 2 D while 
P
(l) 62 D.
In particular, there is an  s.t. for every  , 
P

(Body)2D while 
P

(l) 62 D. But since

P

(Body)2D, for every  >, val
P

(l) = t, which implies that 
P

(l)
k
t, and so 
P

(l)2D.
This contradicts the assumption that 
P

(l) 62D.
2. 
P
induces a paraconsistent consequence relation:
Consider, e.g., P = fp t; :p tg. Here 
P
(p)=> while 
P
(q)=? for every atom q 6=p.
Thus P 6j

q for every atom q 6= p, which means that trivial reasoning from an inconsistent
set of premises is not allowed.
3. 
P
is 
k
-smaller than any other model of P:
For a valuation  denote Sat() = fl j (l) 2Dg. Let  be the xpoint ordinal of 
P
(i.e.,
the minimal  s.t. 
P

0
= 
P

for every 
0
   ). We show that for every model M of P,
Sat(
P

)Sat(M). This immediately implies that 
P

k
M , since in this case, for every atom
p, we have that
 If 
P
(p)=>, then p;:p2Sat(
P

). Thus p;:p2Sat(M), and so M(p)=> as well.
 If 
P
(p) = t, then p2 Sat(
P

), and so p2 Sat(M). Thus M(p) 2 ft;>g, which implies
that M(p)
k

P
(p).
 The case 
P
(p)=f is similar to the one in which 
P
(p)= t.
 If 
P
(p)=? then clearly M(p)
k

P
(p).
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It remains to show, therefore, that for every model M of P, Sat(
P

)Sat(M). We show this
by an induction on . The case =0 is obvious, since Sat(
P
0
)=;. For >0, let l2Sat(
P

).
Then 
P

(l)2ft;>g, and so val
P

(l):val
P

(l)2ft;>g. This means that either val
P

(l)2ft;>g,
or :val
P

(l)2ft;>g (i.e., val
P

(l)2ff;>g). But since for every literal l
0
, val
P

(l
0
)2ft;?g, this
means that in our case necessarily val
P

(l) = t. Hence, there is a general clause of the form
l Body, for which 
P
 1
(Body)2 ft;>g. Thus, for every l
i
2Body, l
i
2Sat(
P
 1
). By the
induction hypothesis, for every l
i
2Body, l
i
2Sat(M), and so M(Body)2ft;>g as well. But
M is a model of P, and so necessarily M(l)2ft;>g, i.e. l2Sat(M).
4. 
P
is at least as consistent as any other model of P:
Denote again by  the xpoint ordinal of 
P
, and let Sat()= fl j (l)2Dg. Suppose that

P
(p) => for some atom p. Then p;:p2 Sat(
P
), and so p;:p2 Sat(
P

). By the proof of
the previous item, for every model M of P, Sat(
P

)Sat(M). Thus p;:p2Sat(M), and so
M(p)=> as well. 2
Proposition 3.6: Let P be a positive logic program, and let P' be the positive program obtained
from P by replacing every implication connective by a material implication. Denote by 
P
f=?
the
valuation that is obtained from 
P
by changing the ?-assignments to f -assignments (I.e., for every
atom p, if 
P
(p)=? then 
P
f=?
(p)=f). Then:
1. P and P
0
have the same classical models (and thus the same least Herbrand model), and
2. 
P
f=?
is the (unique) 2-valued minimal Herbrand model of P and P'.
Proof: The rst claim simply follows from the fact that the implication connective of Denition
2.4 is the same as the material implication on ft; fg. Regarding the other part, note rst that
since only atomic formulae appear in the clauses heads, for every atomic p and for every i we have
that val
P
i
(:p)=?, and therefore 
P
i
(p)=val
P
i
(p)2ft;?g. It follows that 
P
assigns only values in
ft;?g to the atomic formulae (and so, for every literal l, 
P
(l)2ft; f;?g). Now, let p Body be a
clause in P. Since P is positive, then 
P
(Body)= t i all the atoms in Body are assigned t by 
P
,
i all the atoms in Body are assigned t by 
P
f=?
, i 
P
f=?
(Body) = t. Similarly, 
P
(Body)2 ff;?g
i there is an atomic formula in Body that is assigned either ? or f by 
P
, i there is an atomic
formula in Body that is assigned f by 
P
f=?
, i 
P
f=?
(Body) = f . It follows that for every clause
C in P, 
P
(C)2D i 
P
f=?
(C) 2D. Thus 
P
f=?
is a 2-valued model of P. It remains to show that

P
f=?
is 
t
-minimal among the classical models of P. Indeed, this follows from the fact that 
P
is

k
-smaller than any other model of P (Proposition 3.3), and so the set of atomic formulae that
are assigned t by 
P
does not contain any corresponding set of a classical model of P.
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Thus,
the set of atomic formulae that are assigned t by 
P
f=?
does not contain any corresponding set of a
classical model of P either, and so 
P
f=?
is a 
t
-minimal model among the classical models of P.
Since P has the same classical models as those of P
0
(item 1 of this proposition), we conclude that
23
Indeed, if M is a classical model of P and p is an atom s.t. 
P
(p)= t while M(p) 6= t, then M(p) = f , and so

P
6
k
M .
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P
f=?
is also a 
t
-minimal model among the classical models of P
0
. But being positive, P' has only
one 
t
-minimal classical model (which is its least Herbrand model), and so 
P
f=?
coincides with
this model. 2
Proposition 3.9: Let P be a normal logic program in which each atomic formula appears at most
once in a clause head, and let 	
P
be Fitting xpoint semantics for P. Then 	
P
=
P

.
Proof: By Denition 3.8, P

= P [ P
:
where
P
:
= f:p l j p Body 2 P; 
P
(p) = ?; l 2 L(Body)g [
f:p t j p f 2 P; 
P
(p) = ?g.
 Suppose rst that for some q, 	
P
(q)= t. We show that in this case 
P
(q)= t as well. Assuming
this, then by the denition of P
:
, :q cannot appear in the head of any clause of P
:
, and so :q
cannot appear in the head of any clause of P

. It follows, then, that for every , val
P


(:q)=?,
and so 
P


(q) = val
P


(q) 2 ft;?g. Thus 
P

(q) 2 ft;?g. On the other hand, if P
1
 P
2
then

P
2

k

P
1
, thus 
P

(q)
k

P
(q) = t. It follows, then, that 
P

(q) = t, and so 
P

(q) =	
P
(q) in
this case.
To complete the proof for the rst case it remains therefore to show that for every atom q,
if 	
P
(q) = t then 
P
(q) = t as well. Let f	
P
0
;	
P
1
; : : :g be the 
k
-monotonic iterative sequence of
valuations used for constructing 	
P
. Since :q does not appear in any clause head in P, we have
that for every  val
P

(:q) =?, and so 
P

(p) = val
P

(q) = t. Thus, for showing that if 	
P
(q) = t
then 
P
(q) = t, it is sucient to show that for every  and atom q s.t. 	
P

(q) = t, val
P

(q) = t as
well. We show it by induction on . For =0 we have that 	
P
0
(q)=val
P

(q)=?, so the condition
is vacuously met. For  = 1, 	
P
1
(q) = t i q  t 2 P i val
P
1
(q) = t. For  > 1, 	
P

(q) = t i
there is a clause of the form q Body in P and 	
P
 1
(Body) = t, i 8l
i
2L(Body) 	
P
 1
(l
i
) = t,
i (induction hypothesis) 8l
i
2L(Body) val
P
 1
(l
i
)= t. Thus val
P
 1
(Body)= t, which implies that

P
 1
(Body)2D, and so val
P

(q)= t.
 Suppose now that 	
P
(q) = f . Let f	
P
0
;	
P
1
; : : :g be the 
k
-monotonic iterative sequence of
valuations used for constructing 	
P
. We show that for every  and literal l s.t. 	
P

(l) = f ,
val
P


(l) = t. Assuming this, we are able to show that 
P

(q) = 	
P
(q) in this case as well, since
the fact that 	
P
(q) = f implies that there exists some  s.t. for every    	
P

(q) = f , and
so by our assumption, val
P


(:q) = t. Note also that by Proposition 3.3, 
P
is the 
k
-least
model of P, thus, since 	
P
is a model of P, and since f =	
P
(q)
k

P
(q) 2 ft;?g, necessarily

P
(q) = ?. Thus, for every , val
P

(q) = ?. Since q does not appear in the head of clauses in
P
:
, this means that for every , val
P


(q) = ? as well. It follows, then, that for every   

P


(q)=val
P


(q) :val
P


(:q)=? :t=f . One thus concludes that 
P

(q)=f=	
P
(q).
For the second case of the proof it remains, therefore, to show that for every  and a literal l
s.t. 	
P

(l) = f , val
P


(l) = t. We show it by induction on . For =0 the condition is vacuously
met, since 	
P
0
(l)=? for every l. For =1, the fact that 	
P
1
(l)= f entails that l f appears in
P. Since P is a normal program, l must be an atom in this case. Moreover, by our assumption
on P, this is the only clause which contains l as its head, and so 
P
(l) =?. Thus l t appears
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in P
:
, and so val
P

1
(l) = t. Suppose now that for some > 1, 	
P

(l) = f . By the construction of
the 	
P
j
-s, and by our assumption on P, it follows that for the only clause of the form l Body
that appears in P, 	
P
 1
(Body)=f . This means that there is some l
0
2L(Body) s.t. 	
P
 1
(l
0
)=f .
By induction hypothesis, then, val
P

 1
(l
0
) = t. Now, 	
P
(l)
k
	
P

(l) = f thus 	
P
(l) = f . On the
other-hand, using again the fact that 
P
is the 
k
-least model of P and that 	
P
is a model of P,
	
P
(l)
k

P
(l)2ft;?g. Hence 
P
(l)=?. This means that l l
0
appears in P
:
. But val
P

 1
(l
0
)= t,
and so 
P

 1
(l
0
) is designated. Thus, val
P


(l)= t, as required.
 Finally, suppose that 	
P
(q)=?. Again, let f	
P
0
;	
P
1
; : : :g be the
k
-monotonic iterative sequence
of valuations used for constructing 	
P
. This time we show that for every  and literal l s.t.
	
P

(l) =? we have that val
P


(l) =? as well. This implies that 
P

(q) =	
P
(q) also in this case,
since the fact that 	
P
(q) = ? implies that for every , 	
P

(q) = ?, and so by our assumption,
for every  we have that val
P


(:q) = ?. Note also that since ? = 	
P
(q) 
k

P
(q), necessarily

P
(q)=?, and so val
P

(q)=? for every . Since q does not appear in the head of clauses in P
:
,
this means that for every , val
P


(q)=? as well. Thus 
P

(q)=val
P


(q):val
P


(:q)=?:?=?.
It follows that 
P

(q)=?=	
P
(q).
It remains to show that for every  and a literal l s.t. 	
P

(l)=?, we have that also val
P


(l)=?.
We show it by induction on . For =0 this is obviously true, since by their denitions 	
P
0
and
val
P

0
are both identically ?. For =1, 	
P
1
(l)=? i 	
P
1
(p)=? where p is the atomic part of l, i
either p does not appear in the head of any clause of P, or p Body2P and L(Body) 6=;. In the
rst case neither l nor l appear in the head of any clause of P

, and in the second case if a clause
of the form l Body appears in P

, then L(Body) 6=;. In both cases, therefore, val
P

1
(l)=?. For
> 1, 	
P

(l)=? means again that 	
P

(p)=?, where p is the atomic part of l. This can happen
if either p does not appear in the head of any clause of P (which again implies that val
P


(l)=?,
as in the basis of the induction), or else | by our assumption on P | there is a single clause in
P of the form p Body and 	
P
 1
(Body) =?. This means that 8l
0
2L(Body) 	
P
 1
(l
0
)2 ft;?g
(and 9l
0
0
2L(Body) s.t. 	
P
 1
(l
0
0
) =?). By what we have show in the rst case of this proof (in
case that 	
P
 1
(l
0
)= t) and by the induction hypothesis (in case that 	
P
 1
(l
0
)=?), val
P

 1
(l
0
)=?
for every l
0
2 L(Body). Thus, 
P

 1
(l
0
) = val
P

 1
(l
0
) 2 f?; tg. In other words, 
P

 1
(l
0
) 2 f?; fg so

P

 1
(l
0
) is not designated. Since the only clauses in which :p may appear as their head are of the
form :p l
0
, it follows that val
P


(:p)=?. Since p do not appear as a head of any clause in P
:
,
we also have that val
P


(p) = val
P

(p)
k

P

(p)
k

P
(p)
k
	
P
(p) =?. Hence, both val
P


(p) =?
and val
P


(:p)=?. Thus, either if l=p or l=:p, we have that val
P


(l)=?. 2
Proposition 4.14: Let P be a general logic program, and let P
0
be the 1-prioritized logic program
obtained from P by assigning the quantitative factor n=1 to every general clause in P. Then, for
every i, 
P
i
(dened in 3.1) is the same as 
P
0
i
(dened in 4.12).
Proof: First, as noted in Example 4.7, the bilattice B=f0; 1gf0; 1g that gives semantics to the
1-prioritized program P
0
is isomorphic to the bilattice FOUR used in Section 2 to give semantics
to the \at" (non-prioritized) program P. In what follows we shall use both representations to
denote the same elements.
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By the denition of the 
t
-operations and the 
k
-operations in the bilattice f0; 1gf0; 1g, we
have that
24

P
i
(l) = val
P
i
(l) :val
P
i
(l) = ([val
P
i
(l)]
T
; [val
P
i
(l)]
F
) ([val
P
i
(l)]
F
; [val
P
i
(l)]
T
)
= (max([val
P
i
(l)]
T
; [val
P
i
(l)]
F
); max([val
P
i
(l)]
F
; [val
P
i
(l)]
T
)).
But since val
P
i
()2ft;?g=f(1; 0); (0; 0)g, we have that [val
P
i
()]
F
= 0, thus

P
i
(l) = ([val
P
i
(l)]
T
; [val
P
i
(l)]
T
).
Since 
P
0
i
(l) = ([val
P
0
i
(l)]
T
; [val
P
0
i
(l)]
T
), it remains to show that for every i and l, [val
P
i
(l)]
T
=
[val
P
0
i
(l)]
T
. Indeed, recall that all the clauses in P
0
are assigned the maximal condence factor
(which is 1 in our case), and so for every i and l, [threshold
P
i
(l)]
T
 1. It follows, then, that
val
P
0
i
(l) = lub

k
(val
P
0
i 1
(l); belief
P
0
i
(l))
= lub

k
(val
P
0
i 1
(l); lub

k
f
P
0
i 1
(Body
j
) j l
1
 Body
j
2 P
0
g).
Using again the fact that 
P
0
i
(l) = ([val
P
0
i
(l)]
T
; [val
P
0
i
(l)]
T
), we have that
[val
P
0
i
(l)]
T
= max([val
P
0
i 1
(l)]
T
; maxf[
P
0
i 1
(Body
j
)]
T
j l
1
 Body
j
2 P
0
g)
= max([
P
0
i 1
(l)]
T
; maxf[
P
0
i 1
(Body
j
)]
T
j l
1
 Body
j
2 P
0
g).
Since in our case B=f0; 1gf0; 1g, it follows that
[val
P
0
i
(l)]
T
=1 if 9(l
1
 Body) 2 P
0
and 
P
0
i 1
(Body) 2 D
f0;1gf0;1g
,
[val
P
0
i
(l)]
T
=0 otherwise.
On the other hand, by the denition of val
P
i
,
[val
P
i
(l)]
T
=1 if val
P
i
(l)= t, if 9(l Body) 2 P and 
P
i 1
(Body) 2 D
FOUR
,
[val
P
i
(l)]
T
=0 otherwise.
It follows, therefore, that [val
P
i
(l)]
T
= [val
P
0
i
(l)]
T
, as required. 2
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